

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION NO. 322

SECRET 231121Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE SAIGON 2 SECTION ONE OF TWO  
DIRECTOR.

1. ALTHOUGH THE FINAL RESULTS OF ARVN FIASCO IN QUE SON VALLEY OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE MAY NOT BE QUIET AS BAD AS LOCAL CASSANDRAS SUGGEST, THERE NO DOUBT ARVN TOOK ITS WORST BEATING SINCE QUANG TRI CITY FELL. THIS JUDGMENT BASED NOT ONLY ON LOSS OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE (FSB) ROSS (AFTER ALL, BASTOGNE AND CHECKMATE CHANGED HANDS SEVERAL TIMES WITHOUT ANY CRIES OF DESPAIR) BUT ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS WHICH AGAIN REFLECTED INEPT LEADERSHIP AND INDECISIVE REACTION DESPITE EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MACV ALSO HOLDS OPINION THERE WAS CRITICAL COMMAND FAILURE ON PART OF SECOND DIVISION CG BRIGADIER GENERAL HIEP AND WE EXPECT THERE WILL BE PRESSURES ON THIEU THAT HIEP BE REPLACED.

3. TO PUT SITUATION INTO PERSPECTIVE, FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS PREPARED BY \_\_\_\_\_ OF IAB BRANCH OF STATION.

1/A. A REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO 19

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25X1 PAGE 2 SAIGON SECRET

AUGUST, WHEN QUE SON DISTRICT TOWN AND <sup>(Fire Support Base)</sup> (FSB) ROSS WERE LOST TO  
 ENEMY, INDICATES <sup>that</sup> THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES AND TIMETABLE DURING  
 THESE ATTACKS IN QUE SON DISTRICT WERE KNOWN BEFOREHAND. A  
 LIEUTENANT FROM <sup>the</sup> 270TH NVA REGIMENT, 711TH DIVISION, WHO WAS  
 CAPTURED ON 23 JULY, REVEALED <sup>the</sup> GENERAL TIMING OF AN ENEMY'S  
 CURRENT DRIVE AND <sup>indicated out the</sup> INDICATED SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF EACH ENEMY  
 REGIMENT. PRISONERS AND AGENTS <sup>earlier</sup> HAD REPORTED <sup>the</sup> PRESENCE OF  
 ENEMY TANKS AND ARTILLERY IN <sup>the</sup> QUANG TIN PROVINCE WHICH  
 WERE TO BE USED DURING ATTACKS IN <sup>the</sup> QUANG NAM <sup>low</sup> LOWLANDS. THESE  
 REPORTS WERE CONFIRMED BY FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS, AND AIR  
 STRIKES RESULTED IN NUMEROUS SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, AS WELL AS  
 REPORTED DESTRUCTION OF SEVERAL <sup>enemy</sup> ARTILLERY PIECES AND TANKS.  
<sup>This gave a clear evidence</sup> LATTER ACTIVITY <sup>the</sup> THUS GAVE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF AN ENEMY'S BUILDUP  
 OF HEAVY WEAPONS TO SUPPORT <sup>the</sup> 711TH DIVISION IN FURTHER ATTACKS  
 IN QUE SON DISTRICT. <sup>Furthermore,</sup> INTERVIEWS IN LATE MAY WITH BOTH <sup>the</sup> 2ND  
 ARVN DIVISION COMMANDER AND <sup>the</sup> QUANG NAM PROVINCE CHIEF REVEALED  
 THEY WERE AWARE OF <sup>the</sup> ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES AND STRENGTH EVEN AT  
 THAT TIME.

2. B. ENEMY <sup>activity</sup> CAMPAIGNS IN NORTHERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE  
 AND QUE SON DISTRICT <sup>of Quang Nam Province</sup> IN APRIL THROUGH JUNE, <sup>at this year gave other indications</sup> PROVIDED

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PAGE 3 SAIGON   S E C R E T

*that the*  
~~PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THROUGH WHICH~~ 711TH DIVISION WAS PLAN-  
~~NING TO REACH COASTAL AREA SOUTH OF DANANG.~~ *the* ALTHOUGH 2ND  
 ARVN DIVISION FAILED TO RETAKE SEVERAL FIREBASES AND HIEP  
 DUC DISTRICT HQS IN NORTHERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE DURING  
 MAY, *the* 2ND DIVISION'S 5TH AND 6TH REGIMENTS LATER DID HOLD  
 FSB ROSS UNTIL RELIEVED BY 51ST ARVN INDEPENDENT REGIMENT.  
*This in fact ended the*  
~~ENDING~~ 711TH DIVISION'S FIRST CAMPAIGN TO SEIZE QUE SON  
 DISTRICT TOWN AND FSB ROSS.

3c. ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND ATTACKS IN QUE SON DIS-  
 TRICT DURING LATE JULY AND EARLY AUGUST FOLLOWED *the* PATTERN  
 SET EARLIER IN MAY AND JUNE. FIRST, ATTACKS IN *the* MOUNTAINS  
 BORDERING QUE SON DISTRICT INFLECTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON  
 ONE BATTALION OF *the* 6TH ARVN REGIMENT AND A RANGER BATTALION,  
 FORCING OTHERS *(ARVN units back into the)* INTO LOWLANDS. ENEMY SEIZED OUTPOST LION,  
~~SW~~ *Southwest* OF QUE SON DISTRICT TOWN, ON 23 JULY. BY 30 JULY,  
 TWO OF SEVEN ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS FROM *the* 2ND DIVISION  
 AND TWO RANGER BATTALIONS HAD BEEN RENDERED COMBAT IN-  
 EFFECTIVE. SEVERAL RF/PF OUTPOSTS WERE OVERRUN OR ABAN-  
 DONED, AND *continuing* SMALL-SCALE *attacks by fire* ~~ABF HELPED TO RESTRICT~~ *hindered* ARVN MOVE-  
 MENTS AS ENEMY FORCES MANEUVERED INTO BETTER ATTACK

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PAGE 4 SAIGON   S E C R E T

POSITIONS. ARVN AND RF TROOPS DID CONDUCT LIMITED COUNTER-  
 ATTACKS <sup>at this time</sup> TO REGAIN LOST OUTPOSTS AND CLAIMED TO HAVE IN-

FLICTED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON ENEMY FORCES. THE 2ND

REGIMENT, 3RD ARVN DIVISION, REINFORCED ARVN FORCES IN  
<sup>northeast</sup> NE QUE SON DISTRICT DURING EARLY AUGUST. MEANWHILE, <sup>the</sup> 711TH

DIVISION'S ATTACKS IN QUE SON DISTRICT WERE COORDINATED  
<sup>the Viet Cong</sup> WITH VC FRONT 4'S CAMPAIGN IN <sup>the</sup> QUANG NAM AREA, <sup>which included 2</sup> WITH HEAVY  
 ROCKET ATTACK ON DANANG ON 3 AUGUST. <sup>Attacks by fire</sup> AND GROUND PROBES,

AND HARASSMENT CONTINUED IN QUE SON DISTRICT, <sup>in southwest</sup> COASTAL  
 QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND <sup>in southwest</sup> NE QUANG TIN PROVINCE. GRADUALLY

NVA FORCES ISOLATED ARVN AND RF FORCES IN QUE SON DISTRICT  
 BY MAINTAINING PRESSURE AGAINST ARVN INFANTRY <sup>units</sup> AND INITIA-  
 TING SCATTERED SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS. FIVE ARVN ATTEMPTS  
 TO RETAKE OUTPOST LION, WHICH DOMINATES <sup>the</sup> AREA <sup>southwest</sup> SW OF QUE  
 SON TOWN, BETWEEN 24 JULY AND 15 AUGUST FAILED.

4. <sup>1</sup> INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ENEMY PATTERNS  
 OF ACTIVITY INDICATED ENEMY WOULD CONDUCT MAJOR ATTACKS  
 IN QUE SON DISTRICT DURING <sup>the</sup> "AUGUST HIGH POINT." OTHER REPORTS  
 INDICATED <sup>that</sup> ACTIVITY IN QUE SON DISTRICT WOULD BE COORDINATED  
 WITH ATTACKS ON DANANG AND OTHER TARGETS IN <sup>the</sup> QUANG NAM

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PAGE 6 SAIGON   S E C R E TMENT OF ARVN UNITS ALREADY <sup>in the area</sup> ISOLATED. THE 270TH NVA REGIMENT,

THE THIRD REGIMENT OF THE 711TH DIVISION, AND THE 409TH NVA

SAPPER BATTALION REPORTEDLY CUT ROUTE 535 BETWEEN <sup>the landing zone near FSB</sup> LZ BALDY

AND QUE SON TOWN, BLOCKING ARVN REINFORCEMENTS. BRIGADIER

GENERAL HIEP, <sup>the</sup> ~~2ND ARVN~~ COMMANDING GENERAL, <sup>of the 2nd ARVN Division,</sup> REQUESTED ~~1 CORPS~~~~HEADQUARTERS~~ PERMISSION <sup>from BR 1 Headquarters</sup> TO ABANDON FSB ROSS AT NOON <sup>04</sup> 19 AUGUST,

BUT WAS REFUSED AND ORDERED TO HOLD THE POSITION. BY EARLY

MORNING <sup>of the 19th</sup> NVA SOLDIERS <sup>had</sup> OCCUPIED TWO-THIRDS OF THE FIREBASE,BUT WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OUT. LATER REPORTSINDICATED THAT HEAVY ARTILLERY ATTACKS DEMORALIZED <sup>the</sup> ARVN

DEFENDERS, WHO WERE FURTHER CONFUSED BY A HEAVY TEAR GAS

CONCENTRATION WHEN STORED CS ROUNDS WERE HIT BY ARTILLERYFIRE. <sup>The</sup> NVA ATTACKERS GAINED CONTROL OF <sup>FSB</sup> ROSS THROUGH SMALLGROUND PROBES RATHER THAN BY <sup>2</sup> LARGE-SCALE ASSAULT. A REPORT

THAT ARVN HAD REGAINED CONTROL OF ROSS APPARENTLY CAUSED

CANCELLATION OF <sup>air</sup> STRIKES WHICH <sup>hindered</sup> MIGHT HAVE <sup>hindered</sup> THEENEMY. BACK AT <sup>the landing zone near FSB</sup> LZ BALDY, A RELIEF COLUMN SCHEDULED <sup>to depart at</sup> FOR DAWNFAILED TO MOVE UNTIL 1600, APPARENTLY <sup>because of</sup> DUE TO CONFUSION AND

LACK OF COORDINATION. BY THEN IT WAS TOO LATE, SINCE QUE SON

DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS WAS ABANDONED BY THE RF/PF DEFENDERS

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PAGE 5 SAIGON   S E C R E TLOWLANDS ON OR ABOUT 19 AUGUST, <sup>the</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF <sup>the</sup> PROCLAMATIONOF THE DRV. <sup>the</sup> MACV DISUM AND STATION SITREPS CARRIED ITEMS ON<sup>the</sup> INCREASING <sup>leaving</sup> PRESSURES IN THE QUANG NAM/QUE SON AREA <sup>almost</sup> ~~AND~~

EVERY DAY OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS PRIOR TO THE NIGHT OF 17/18

AUGUST, <sup>in that night</sup> ~~WHEN~~ NVA FORCES INFILTRATED THE AREA BETWEEN THE5TH ARVN REGIMENT AT FSB ROSS AND <sup>the</sup> QUE SON DISTRICT HEAD-

QUARTERS, WHICH WAS HELD BY RF FORCES, EFFECTIVELY ISOLATING

THEM. ON 18 AUGUST, NVA 130MM FIELD ARTILLERY, FIRING FOR THE

FIRST TIME IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, DEMORALIZED <sup>the</sup> ARVN DEFENDERS~~OF~~ FSB ROSS WHILE THE NVA 31ST REGIMENT PINNED <sup>then</sup> DOWN ~~ARVN~~~~DEFENDERS~~ WITH CONTINUOUS MORTAR AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIREAND <sup>the</sup> OCCASIONAL USE OF SAGGER WIRE-GUIDED MISSILES. THREEKILOMETERS <sup>to the east</sup> ~~EAST~~ THE 38TH NVA REGIMENT BLOCKED THE GVN LINEOF COMMUNICATIONS. RELIEVING <sup>ARVN</sup> FORCES AT FSB BALDY IN <sup>northeast</sup> ~~THE~~ QUESON DISTRICT WERE PINNED DOWN BY <sup>artillery and mortar fire</sup> ~~ABT~~ WHILE THE ARVN 2ND

REGIMENT REMAINED IMMOBILE IN THE NORTHERN FOOTHILLS OF QUE

SON DISTRICT. OTHER NVA FORCES ENVELOPED THE ROSS-QUE SON

TOWN AREA FROM THE SOUTH, CUTTING ROUTE 534. DANANG AND

OTHER GVN POPULATION CENTERS AND ARVN ~~BASES~~ <sup>fire support bases</sup> WITHIN SUPPORTINGDISTANCE OF QUE SON DISTRICT <sup>were hit with attacks by fire</sup> ~~RECEIVED ABT~~ TO PREVENT REINFORCE-SAGGER  
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*baln* AT 1300<sup>hours</sup> AND AT 1600<sup>hours</sup> FSB ROSS WAS EVACUATED BY THE 5TH ARVN REGIMENT.

6. ~~P.~~ A GENERAL RETREAT OF GVN FORCES TOWARD ~~THE~~ BALDY OCCURRED DURING THE NIGHT <sup>of 19-20 August</sup> AND ~~EARLY MORNING OF 20 AUGUST.~~

SOME SEMBLANCE OF ORDER WAS RESTORED DURING A LULL IN NVA ACTIVITY WHICH PROBABLY REFLECTED A NEED TO REGROUP. FRIENDLY LOSSES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN HEAVY. THE 5TH ARVN REGIMENT WAS RENDERED COMBAT INEFFECTIVE; EQUIPMENT LOSSES INCLUDED EIGHT M-41 TANKS, 22 ARTILLERY PIECES, AT LEAST 16 APC'S, AND ONE TOW MISSILE LAUNCHER.

7. ~~P.~~ ON 21 AND 22 AUGUST <sup>24 ARVN</sup> A COUNTEROFFENSIVE MADE ONLY VERY LIMITED PROGRESS DESPITE PREPARATORY B-52 AND TACAIR STRIKES. <sup>at this time</sup> WHILE THE 711TH NVA DIVISION APPEARED TO BE REGROUPING FOR FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE FLANKS OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN EASTERN QUE SON DISTRICT. SENSITIVE SOURCES INDICATE THAT THE 711TH NVA DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND ITS FORWARD ELEMENT <sup>had</sup> ~~HAVE~~ MOVED TO WITHIN SEVEN AND TWO KILOMETERS RESPECTIVELY OF <sup>the landing zone near FSB</sup> BALDY. ENEMY 130MM ARTILLERY <sup>had</sup> APPARENTLY ALSO MOVED FORWARD AND <sup>was</sup> ~~IS~~ REGISTERING ON BALDY WITH LIGHT ABF.

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PAGE 8 SAIGON   S E C R E T

LOWLANDS, <sup>was, as of 23 August,</sup> ~~IS CURRENTLY~~ OCCUPIED BY REMNANTS OF THE 5TH ARVN REGIMENT AND ONE BATTALION OF THE 6TH REGIMENT. SIX BATTALIONS FROM THE ARVN 2ND AND 6TH REGIMENTS AND THREE RF BATTALIONS ~~CURRENTLY~~ FORM <sup>a</sup> DEFENSIVE LINE ABOUT SIX KILOMETERS EAST OF FSB ROSS. THE SITUATION HAS <sup>d</sup> APPARENTLY STABILIZED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

9. ~~A~~ A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEBACLE PROBABLY HAS BEEN POOR LEADERSHIP OF THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, BRIGADIER GENERAL HIEP, WAS RATED AS POOR BY U.S. ADVISORS WHEN HE COMMANDED THE 1ST ARMOR BRIGADE. THE 2ND DIVISION ITSELF WAS CONSIDERED A GOOD UNIT BECAUSE OF LOW DESERTIONS AND A SEEMINGLY GOOD COMBAT RECORD AGAINST VC LOCAL FORCES. HOWEVER, THERE <sup>was</sup> ~~WAS~~ CONSISTENT REPORTING SUGGESTING THAT PREVIOUS AS WELL AS CURRENT DIVISION AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS <sup>have</sup> ~~GROSSLY~~ EXAGGERATED OR FABRICATED OPERATIONAL CLAIMS AND MINIMIZED THEIR OWN LOSSES. <sup>The</sup> ~~LACK~~ OF AGGRESSIVENESS, POOR COORDINATION, FAILURE TO SUPPORT RF/FF UNITS, AND <sup>the</sup> ~~COLLAPSE~~ OF THE DEFENSE OF FSB ROSS CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED BY PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AT THE REGIMENTAL AND DIVISION LEVEL.

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